TORTS-WRONGFUL

DEATH-ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH NOT
EXTINGUISHED BY DECEDENT'S PERSONAL INJURY RECOVERY-Alfone

v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981).

The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently departed from its
established interpretation of the nature of the rights granted by the
Wrongful Death Act.' In Alfone v. Sarno,2 a nearly unanimous court
found that a recovery by a decedent during her lifetime did not
preclude a subsequent wrongful death action by her beneficiaries "if

the recovery [was] tailored to avoid duplicating elements of damages
which comprised or could have comprised the earlier judgment."'
By making the rights of the wrongful death plaintiff virtually inde-

pendent of those of the decedent, however, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has created a host of practical problems for all parties in tort
litigation.
Alfone v. Sarno evolved out of a medical malpractice suit filed in
September of 1968. 4 The suit was originally filed by Concetta Alfone
against Dr. Sarno for the negligent performance of two subtotal thyroidectomies. 5 At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:31-1 to -6 (West 1952). The section creating the right of action for
wrongful death provides:
When the death of a person caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an
action for damages resulting from the injury, the person who would have been liable
in damages for the injury if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured and although the death
was caused under circumstances ambunting in law to a crime.
Id. § 2A:31-1.
87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981), aff'g ag modified 168 N.J. Super. 315, 403 A.2d 9 (App.
Div. 1979).
3 Id. at 102, 432 A.2d at 859.
Id. Thirteen years after the initial filing of suit, this case was on remand for a hearing and
final disposition. The case was settled within three months of this opinion.
' Id. Dr. Sarno treated Ms. Alfone for a period of twelve years. The initial allegation of
malpractice included a surgical procedure performed in the early 1960's. This allegation was
later dropped. The alleged malpractice arose out of a surgical procedure performed on March
11, 1965 on Ms. Alfone's thyroid which resulted in damages to her parathyroids. The pathology
report indicated that at least one of the parathyroids was surgically excised. Alfone v. Sarno, 139
N.J. Super. 518, 521, 534 A.2d 654, 656 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 498, 366 A.2d 654
(1976). According to 2 CECIL, Tv-rBooK OF MEDICINE § 552.3, at 2220 (15th ed. 1975): "Hypoparathyroidism is the syndrome characterized by deficient secretion of parathyroid hormone
with consequent hypocalcemia ....
Hypoparathyroidism is the consequence of the mechanical
injury to or removal of the parathyroid glands." Id. The physical consequences of hypoparathyroidism are calcification of the basal ganglia, cataracts, and abnormal density of the bones. The
hpocalcemia leads to increased neuromuscular excitability and tetany. Id. Hypocalcemic tetany
is manifested by numbness and tingling in the fingers, toes, and lips. Dyspnea and cyanosis are
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jury that if they found for the plaintiff, the damage award should
consist of compensation for temporary and permanent physical injury; past, present, and future pain and suffering; and, incurred and
anticipated medical expenses. 6 Significantly, future lost earnings
were not included as an element of damages. 7 The judge further
instructed the jury that Ms. Alfone had a life expectancy of 44.1 years
and that this life expectancy could be used in calculating any award of
damages. 8 The jury returned a verdict of $100,000 for Ms. Alfone.0
Dr. Sarno appealed this verdict, arguing that the malpractice suit had
been barred by the statute of limitations. 10 The appellate court, in an
unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded." On remand, the
trial judge entered judgment for the defendant 2 and a second appeal
was instituted, this time by Ms. Alfone. 13 During the pendency of the
appeal, Ms. Alfone died intestate and was replaced as plaintiff by her
father, Alphonse Alfone, general administrator of the estate. 14 In the
second appeal the court held that the action by Concetta Alfone
should not have been barred by the statute of limitations" and
sometimes apparent. In severe tetany, cramps of individual muscle groups in the hands and feet
occur. There may also be convulsions or abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. Id. Epiligtiforni
attacks are a striking symptom of hypoparathyroidism. Usually seizures are of a grand mal type.
Mental abnormalities including irritability, emotion liability, moroseness, impairment of meniory, mental confusion, lethargy, depression, and mental deficiency may occur. Id.
This is the classic clinical picture of hypoparathyroidism. It is not a statement as to which of
these symptoms Concetta Alfone exhibited. The prognosis of hypoparathyroidism as given by
Cecil is important, as it may help explain the final result in this case: "[h]ypoparathyroidism that
follows thyroid or parathyroid surgery may often be transient. . . .The prognosis is excellent
with full life expectancy in established cases adequately treated." Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
The prognosis, as stated in the definitive textbook on clinical medicine, may explain why the
element of future lost earnings was not included within the award of damages. Based upon this
prognosis, the plaintiff might not have been able to prove to a medical certainty that her life
expectancy had been foreshortened. The supreme court remanded this case to determine
whether the plaintiff could have or should have been able to establish a claim for future lost
earnings based upon a foreshortening of her life. 87 N.J. at 123-24, 432 A.2d at 870.
8 87 N.J. at 103, 432 A.2d at 859.
7 Id. It is not clear from the opinion whether the issue was never litigated, stricken due to
insufficient proofs, or not submitted to the jury for some other reason. See also note 5 supra.
8 Alfone v. Sarno, 168 N.J. Super. 315, 319, 403 A.2d 9, 10 (App. Div. 1979). affid as
modified, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981). This estimation was based upon the mortality tables
appended to the New Jersey Court Rules.
9 Alfone v. Sarno, 139 N.J. Super. 518, 521, 354 A.2d 654, 656 (App. Div.), certif. denied.
71 N.J. 498, 366 A.2d 654 (1976).
10 Id.

1 Alfone v. Sarno, 168 N.J. Super. 315, 318-19, 403 A.2d 9, 10 (App. Div. 1979), affd as
modified, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981).
1' id.
13 Id.
1IId. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 provides for the survival of an action after the victim's
death.
Is Alfone v. Sarno, 168 N.J. Super. 315, 318, 403 A.2d 9, 10 (App. Div. 1979). aff'd as
modified, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981). Both appeals taken in the personal injury action were
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accordingly reinstated the $100,000 judgment in favor of her espaid the judgment and a
tate.' 6 In September of 1976, the defendant
7

warrant of satisfaction was entered.1
In March of 1976, just one week short of the limitations period
for bringing a wrongful death action,' 8 Alphonse Alfone filed a second
action as administrator ad prosequendum' 9 for the wrongful death of
his daughter, Concetta Alfone. 20 Defendant responded with a mo-

tion for summary judgment, contending that the successful prosecution of the personal injury action barred a subsequent wrongful death

action. 21 The trial judge granted this motion for summary judgment,
but the appellate division later reversed .22

based upon contentions that the trial judge erroneously interpreted the Lopez discovery standard
for the statute of limitations. See Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973): note 116
supra. In Alfone v. Sarno, 139 N.J. Super. 518, 354 A.2d 654 (App. Div.). certif. denied, 71 N.J.
498, 366 A.2d 654 (1976), the appellate division considered
whether under Lopez . . . a cause of action for medical malpractice accrues only
when a patient/victim of the malpractice knows or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence and intelligence should know that the injury . . . was related to fault on
the part of the physician as distinguished from mere knowledge of a causal relationship (without negligence) between the doctor's acts and the injury.
Id. at 520, 354 A.2d at 656. The issue squarely addressed was what level of awareness the
supreme court deemed necessary to trigger the accrual of a cause of action in a medical
malpractice case.
After assessing the equities, the court held that the plaintiff had "sustained the burden of
proving that she [was] entitled to the indulgence of the equitable rule relieving her of the bar of
the statute of limitations." Id. at 5-5, 354 A.2d at 658. The court closely examined the testimony
relating to discussions between Ms. Alfone and Dr. Sarno. The court determined that these
discussions caused her to be ignorant of her cause of action, since they diverted her attention
away from consideration of fault on the part of the defendant. Id. For the most recent decision
on the Lopez discovery rule, see Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 424 A.2d 1169 (1981), wherein
Alfone v. Sarno, 139 N.J. Super. 518, 354 A.2d 654 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 498, 366
A.2d 654 (1976), is cited with approval.
10Alfone v. Sarno, 139 N.J. Super. 518, 525, 354 A.2d 654, 658 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
71 N.J. 498, 366 A.2d 654 (1976).
" Alfone v. Sarno, 168 N.J. Super. 315, 319, 403 A.2d 9, 10-11 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd as
modified, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981).
1, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-3 (West 1952) states: "Every action brought under this chapter
shall be commenced within two years after the death of the decedent, and not thereafter."
1gThe Act requires that "Every action commenced under this chapter shall be brought in the
name of an administrator ad prosequendum of the decedent for whose death damages are
sought, except where the decedent dies testate." Id. § 2A:31-2.
2 Alfone v. Sarno, 168 N.J. Super. 315, 318, 403 A.2d 9, 10-11 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd as
modified, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981). Concetta Alfone was survived by her father, mother,
and teenage daughter. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-4 (West 1952) for limitations on statutory
beneficiaries.
" Alfone v. Sarno, 168 N.J. Super. 315, 319, 403 A.2d 9, 11 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd as
modified, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981).
2- Id. at 333, 403 A.2d at 18.
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The appellate court's opinion examined eighty years of New
Jersey precedent in the wrongful death area.2 3 The court acknowl-

edged that the availability of a cause of action under the Wrongful
Death Act had been dependent upon the availability of a cause of
action in the decedent. 2 4 After evaluating the dicta in Lawlor v.
Cloverleaf Memorial Park, Inc.,25 however, the appellate judge concluded that if presented with the issue, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey would substantially alter its present position. 26 Consequently,
the action was reinstated based on two findings of the appellate
division. The first finding was that the New Jersey Supreme Court
was predisposed to find that a cause of action for wrongful death was
not barred by a prior action for personal injury. 27 The second was
that the damages awarded to Ms. Alfone in the personal injury action

would not be duplicated in a wrongful death action, 28 Ms. Alfone
having never recovered future lost earnings, 29 the primary basis of the

30
damages award for wrongful death.
The question upon certification was one of statutory interpreta3
tion. ' The supreme court had to decide whether consecutive actions
for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of the same tortious

2 See id. at 324-25, 403 A.2d at 12-14.
24 Id. at 325, 403 A.2d at 13.
25 56 N.J. 326, 343-45, 266 A.2d 569, 577-79 (1970). In Lawlor, Justice Jacobs wrote:
These cases take the persuasive position that the statutory terminology 'relates to the
character of the injury, without regard to the question of time of suit or death.'

Hoover's Admx. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 46 W.Va. 268, 33 S.E. 224 (1899).
Much the same approach might be gathered from this Court's statement in Graf V.
Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 305-06 (1964), that the italicized language in [the Wrongful
Death Act] was 'intended to preclude recovery where the injured person could not

have recovered because the defendant did not commit a wrongful act or the deceased's own conduct would have barred his right to recover.'
56 N.J. at 344-45, 266 A.2d at 579.
28 Alfone v. Sarno, 168 N.J. Super. 315, 327-28. 403 A.2d 9, 15-16 (App. Div.), afj'd as
modified, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981).
27 Id. While agreeing with the appellate judge's conclusions regarding the viability of the
wrongful death action, Justice Pashman suggested that he may have exceeded his authority in
reaching those conclusions. 87 N.J. at 105 n.5, 432 A.2d at 851 n.5.
28 Alfone v. Sarno, 168 N.J. Super. 315, 332, 403 A.2d 9, 18 (App. Div. 1979), af'd as
modified, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981). The supreme court was not convinced that the facts
developed below warranted that conclusion and therefore remanded the case for clarification of
the damage question. 87 N.J. at 123, 432 A.2d at 870.
29 87 N.J. at 123, 432 A.2d at 870. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-5 (West 1952) states: "In every action brought under the
provisions of this chapter the jury may give such damages as they shall deem fair and just with
reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons entitled to any
intestate personal property of the decedent."
31 87 N.J. at 103, 432 A.2d at 860.
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occurrence were consistent with the terms and intent of the rights
granted by the Wrongful Death Act. 32 The essential issue was
whether the prosecution to judgment of the personal injury claim by

the tort victim barred the beneficiary from the remedy of a wrongful
death action. 33 The issue was narrowly focused on the Act, as it was
34
the sole source of remedy for the family of a deceased tort victim.
Recovery for wrongful death was a remedy which did not exist in
the common law. 35 At common law "the death of a human being
could not be complained of as an injury." 36 The prototypic legislative response was the passage, in England, of the first wrongful death
act in 1846, popularly known as Lord Campbell's Act. 37 In 1848,

32 Id.

11Id. at 105, 432 A.2d at 860.

31 Meyers v. Holborn, 58 N.J.L. 193, 195-96, 33 A. 389, 390 (1895). Justice Grummere

wrote:
[Slince the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Grosso v. Delaware,
Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co.. 21 Vroom 317, it has been considered as
settled law in this state that no action will lie for an injury caused by the death of a
human being, with the exception of that provided by the [Wrongful Death Act]
which permits a recovery by the personal representatives of the decedent, for the
benefit of the widow and the next of kin, of the pecuniary loss resulting to them from
such death.
Id.
35 Id.

3 Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808). Compare Hyatt v.
Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 185 (1867) ("to the cultivated and enlightened mind, looking at human
life in the light of the Christian religion as sacred, the idea of compensating its loss in money is
revolting') and Grosso v. Delaware Lackawanna & W.R.R. Co., 50 N.J.L. 317, 320, 13 A. 233,
235 (1888) ("it is inconsistent with the policy of the law to permit the value of human life to
become the subject of judicial computation") with Sullivan v. Union Pac. R.R., 23 Fed. Cas. 368
(No. 13,599, 1874) (later discredited by Insurance Co. v. Broome, 95 U.S. 754 (1877)). See Cross
v. Cuthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794) (early American judges unaware of common law rule
dispensed more rudimentary form of justice which allowed them to place financial value on life).
See generally 1 S. SPEisER, REcOvERY FOR VnRONCFUL DEATH (2d ed. 1975); Duffy, The
Maldistribution of Damages in Wrongful Death, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 264 (1958); Malone, The
Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1043 (1965); Smedley, Wrongful Death-Basesof
the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REv. 605 (1960).
1 An Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents (Lord Campbell's
Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c.93. Lord Campbell's Act read in part:
Whereas no action at law is now maintainable against a person who by his
wrongful Act, Neglect or Default may have caused the Death of another person ....

Be it therefore enacted ....

That whensoever the Death of a Person shall

be caused by a wrongful Act, Neglect or Default, and the Act, Neglect or Default is
such as would [if Death had not ensued] have entitled the Party injured to maintain
an Action . .. in respect thereof, then, and in every such Case, the Person who
would have been liable if Death had not ensued, shall be liable to an Action for
Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured, and although the Death
shall have been caused under such Circumstances as to amount in Law to a Felony.
II. And be it enacted, That every such Action shall be for the Benefit of the
Wife, Husband, Parent and Child of the Person whose Death shall have been so
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New Jersey adopted most of the essential language of Lord Campbell's
Act. 38 At present, all but one of the fifty states have adopted the
3
Wrongful Death Act in some form .
Passage of the Wrongful Death Act did not transfer the decedent's personal right of action for his lifetime injuries to his beneficia-

ries, but created a wholly new remedy for the losses incurred by them
as a result of his death. 40 The remedy granted by the Act was limited

to pecuniary losses such as loss of support, loss of advice and guidance,
and funeral expenses. 4 1 Unlike the survival action, the wrongful
death action did not remedy the common law rule that a right of
action died with the person. 42 If the original tort victim died before

38 New Jersey's first Wrongful Death Act stated in pertinent part:

Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey.
that whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect or
Default, and the Act, Neglect or Default is such as would if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, then and in every such case the person who or the corporation which, would
have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages.
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have
amounted in law to felony.
caused, and shall be brought by and in the Name of the Executor or Administrator of
the Person deceased; and in every such Action the Jury may give such Damages as
they think proportioned to the Injury resulting from such Death to the Parties
respectively for whom and for whose Benefit such Action shall be brought ....
III. Provided always, and be it enacted, That not more than One Action shall
lie for and in respect of the same Subject Matter of the Complaint ...
Id. Point III has never been enacted in New Jersey. Had Point III been enacted the decision in
Alfone might never have been reached. It is interesting to note that the majority opinion never
argued that the failure of the New Jersey legislature to adopt Point III indicated a desire not to
bar successive suits. Justice Clifford does mention that Point III was never adopted but does not
attach any significance to it. 87 N.J. at 127 n.2, 432 A.2d at 875 n.2 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Act of March 3, 1848 Pub. L. No. 1848, at 151.
The act was amended regarding persons entitled to bring suit and those entitled to the
amount recovered. The language quoted changed in the codification of the Revised Statutes in
1937 when the present wording of the statute was adopted. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 31-1 to -6
(West 1952).
39 87 N.J. at 127 n.3, 432 A.2d at 872 n.3 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
40 Cooper v. Shore Elec., 63 N.J.L. 558, 44 A. 633 (1899); Schumaker, Rights of Action
Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 MIcH. L. REv. 114 (1924).
41 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-5 (West 1952); note 30 supra. See also notes 104 & 140 infra.
42 The common law maxim was "'actiopersonalis moritur cum persona"-a personal action
dies with the person. Malone, supra note 36, at 1045. The reason given historically for this
maxim was best elucidated in Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort. 29 COLUM. L. REV.
239 (1929):
Perhaps it was the criminal hue that coloured trespass for such a long time.
Crime is a very personal matter. Death pays all when the criminal has gone. *The
party cannot be punished when he is dead.' And even if he survives, and it is the
injured party who has died, surely it is the king and not the representatives who
should take up redress.
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the adjudication of his claim, the right of redress in the form of a
survival action was granted to the estate.4 3 By definition, a survival

action provides that personal actions shall not abate at death, but
shall be carried on by the estate. The estate recovers all losses that
accrued to the original victim between injury and death, including,
but not limited to the medical expenses, and pain and suffering of the
victim."4 A major difference between the wrongful death action and
the survival action, besides the basis on which damages are calcu-

lated, is that the amount recovered under the survival action is subject
to the claims of the decendent's creditors and to estate taxes, whereas

the wrongful death recovery, belonging exclusively to the statutory
beneficiaries, is beyond the reach of such claims. 45 New Jersey has
recognized both the wrongful death action and the survival action. 46
Potential for conflict between the two statutory schemes exists as
each involves separately held claims arising from the same tortious
occurrence. 47 There is no conflict if the survival action and the
wrongful death action are brought concurrently, as all claims are
addressed in one adjudication. 48 Conflict only materializes when a

substantial time elapses between the original tort and the subsequent
fatality, and the tort victim lives long enough to determine conclusively the outcome of his claim. 4 In New Jersey, as in most states,
the course of action taken by the original victim for his personal
injuries could foreclose the possible long-term rights of his dependents
for their pecuniary losses. 50 It is doubtful that this problem was ever
contemplated when the Wrongful Death Act was passed in 1848.51

Id. at 249. For a complete discussion of the origins of the common law bar to recovery for
wrongful death, see 1 S. SFIsE4, supra note 36, § 1:1 to 1:9; Malone, supra note 36, at 1045;
Smedley, .supra note 36, at 606-24.
" N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 (West 1938) provides that "'Executors and administrators may
have an action for any trespass done to the person to property, real or personal, of their testator
or intestate against the trespasser, and recover these damages as their testator or intestate would
have had if he was living." For a complete discussion of the different interests and claims
involved in both survival and wrongful death actions, see 1 S. SpFlsem, supra note 36, §§ 1:2 to
1:3, at 5-13; Schumaker, supra note 40, at 114.
41See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 (West 1938); note 43 supra.
41 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 (West 1938).
" Soden v. Trenton & Mercer County Traction Corp., 101 N.J.L. 393, 127 A. 558 (1925).
" See Schumaker, supra note 40, at 130-31.
"sSee Soden v, Trenton & Mercer County Traction Corp., 101 N.J.L. 393, 127 A. 558

(1025).
" See Schumaker, supra note 40, at 130-31.

0 S. S,,sER, supra note 36, § 1:1 to 1:9. See generally V. Pnosslm, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF Tom-s § 127, at 911 (4th ed. 1971); Malone, supra note 36, at 1067.
5'See Fleming, The Lost Years: A Problem in the Computation and Distribution oj Damages, 50 CAL. L. REv. 598, 607 (1962). "Itis highly doubtful whether the problem was ever
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Current advances in medical care have exacerbated a deficiency
in the law, since the severely injured frequently live many years
beyond the original tort. An injured person faced with the pressures of
mounting medical bills and loss of income frequently cannot consider
the long-term needs of his beneficiaries or may not anticipate that his
injury will be the proximate cause of his death. When such incompatible interests arose, the courts were forced to determine whether the
recovery by the original victim foreclosed the rights of the next of
kin. 52 The underlying issue was whether the rights of the beneficiaries were derivative or independent of the rights of the original vic53
tim.
This controversy arose from the very language of the Wrongful
Death Act. 54 The language, "when the death of a person is caused by
a wrongful act, neglect or default, such as would if death had not
ensued have entitled the person injured to maintain an action for
damages,- 55 was susceptible of two interpretations. The "great weight
of authority" 56 took the language to mean that any procedural or
jurisdictional bars available against the victim also barred the wrongful death plaintiff. 57 For example, in a jurisdiction which followed
this "derivative" interpretation, if the decedent allowed the statute of
limitations to run on his personal injury claim, the wrongful death
claim would also be barred regardless of when it was commenced. 58

within the contemplation of the framers of the statute who more probably envisaged a standardtype of accident proving fatal, if not instantaneously, at least within a brief interval thereafter."
ld.
52 See Schumaker, supra note 40, at 123.
33 See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R. 579-92 (1925).
54 See I S. SpEjsma, supra note 36, § 1:12 to 1:13; Schumaker, supra note 40, at 115.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (West 1952) (emphasis added).

56

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGME'4Ts

§ 92.1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).

This interpretation was first articulated in Read v. Great Eastern R. Co. L. R.. 3 Q.B. 555
(1868), in which the court held:
Before
The question turns upon the construction of [Lord Campbell's Act] ....
that statute the person who received a personal injury and survived its consequences,
could bring an action, anl recover damages for the injury; but if he died from its
effects, then no action could be brought. To meet this state of the law the [statute]
was passed, and "whenever the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, and
the act is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action, and recover damages in respect thereof, then . . . the person
who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable for an action for
damages notwithstanding the death of the party injured." Here, taking the plea to
be true, the party injured could not "maintain an action in respect thereof," because
he had already received satisfaction.
Id. at 558 (citations omitted).
-" "IT]he statute gives an action only if the decedent has one, and since the decedent had lost
his right of action by lapse of time, his representative had none." Coulter v. New Jersey
57
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This majority view focused on the original claim and regarded the
availability of a viable right of action in the decedent as a condition

precedent to the wrongful death action.59
Under the "independent" interpretation, the statutory language
was deemed to refer only to the tortious nature of the conduct. 0 In
the statute of limitations problem given above, the running of the
statute of limitations on the personal injury claim would not bar the

wrongful death plaintiff6 ' because the limitation in the statutory lan-

guage related only to the initial tort. Subsequent conduct by the

62
victim did not affect the cause of action accruing to the beneficiary.
The leading case supporting the independent interpretation was Rowe
v. Richards, 3 where the court ruled that acts of the decedent had no
effect upon a cause of action that did not accrue until his death, at
64
which time it accrued in favor of another.
The United States Supreme Court put its imprimatur on the

minority position in the case of Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet. 5 In
Gaudet, the Court held that the lifetime recovery by an injured
longshoreman did not bar a subsequent wrongful death action by his
6 7
widow."6 The case was decided, however, under admiralty law,

and it only established that the Supreme Court did not find successive
actions for personal injury and wrongful death violative of the principle of res judicata.68 The Court, however, laid down protective

Pulverizing Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 5,6-7,163 A. 661, 661 (1932). "We agree that where any right of
action by the living party injured was barred by limitations before his death, the Death Act does
not create a right of action in the personal representative." Knabe v. Hudson Bus Transp. Co.,
111 N.J.L. 333, 335, 168 A. 418, 418 (1933).
'
See note 57 infra.
"0 See Schumaker, supra note 40, at 124.
"
Duffy, supra note 36, at 273; Schumaker, supra note 40, at 121.
.
See note 64 infra and accompanying text.
35 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001 (1915).
" Id. at 206, 151 N.V. at 1006.
We must confess our inability to grasp the logic of any course of so-called
reasoning through which the conclusion is drawn that the husband simply because
he may live to suffer from a physical injury and thus become vested with a cause of
action for the violation of his own personal right, has an implied power to release a
cause of action-one which has not then accrued; one which may never accrue; one
which from its very nature cannot accrue until his death; and one which, if it ever
does accrue, will accrue in favor of his wife and be based solely upon a violation of a
right vested solely in the wife.
Id.
414 U.S. 573 (1974).
Id. at 591.
Ild. at 576-77.
Id. at 573-74. The res judicata argument was not generally advanced to bar a wrongful
death claim; the majority's argument was that the limitation was inherent in the statute itself.
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limitations on successive actions. These limitations, composed of prin-

ciples of collateral estoppel and fiduciary duty, were aimed at avoiding duplication of damages.6 9 The adoption by the Supreme Court of
the "independent" position may have been a substantial factor in
influencing the Alfone court's interpretation of the wrongful death
statute.
The New Jersey courts, adhering to the derivative interpretation,
repeatedly held that the Act was decedent-oriented and utilized common law and statutory defenses to defeat theoretically meritless
claims. 70 For example, wrongful death claims were barred where the
tort victim had failed to bring his claim for personal injury within the
statute of limitations. 7' Also, settlement of the personal injury claim
was held to bar the subsequent prosecution of a wrongful death
action. 72 New Jersey precedent was so well established that the Third
Circuit ruled that under New Jersey law prosecution to judgment of a
personal injury action unequivocally barred the bringing of a wrong73
ful death claim.
The first intimation in New Jersey that a wrongful death action
was not dependent upon derivative rights was found in Lawlor v.
Cloverleaf Memorial Park, Inc. 74 There the issue presented was
0 Justice Brennan held that:
[W]hen a decedent brings his own personal injury action during his lifetime and
recovers damages for his lost wages he acts in a fiduciary capacity to the extent that
he represents his dependents' interest in that portion of his prospective earnings
which, but for his wrongful death, they had a reasonable expectation of his providing for their support. Since the decedent's recovery of any future wages will normally be dependent upon his fully litigating that issue, we need not fear that
applying principles of collateral estoppel to preclude the decedent's dependents
claim for a portion of those future wages will deprive the dependents of their day in
court.
Id. at 594-95.
71 See, e.g., notes 71-73 infra.
71 E.g., Knabe v. Hudson Bus Transp. Co., 111 N.J.L. 332, 168 A. 418 (1933): Coulter v.
New Jersey Pulverizing Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 5, 163 A. 661 (1932).
7 Liberia v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, 20 N.J. Super. 292, 89 A.2d 734 (Law Div. 1952).
At the time of his death [the deceased] had done all he could do to release the
defendant from liability and at that time there existed a binding and enforceable
obligation against the defendant to pay the promised sum. Under [the] circumstances it appears clear that the release. .. constitutes a bar to the present [wrongful
death) action.
Id. at 295, 89 A.2d at 736.
73 Roberts v. Union Carbide Corp., 415 F.2d 474, 475 (3d Cir. 1969). The court noted: "[Alt
least two New Jersey cases support the proposition that plaintiffs cause of action is barred and
extinguished by the decedent's having obtained a recovery during his lifetime. [T]his view is
consistent with that of nearly all states having similar statutes." Id. (citing Lawlor, and Liberia
v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, 20 N.J. Super. 292, 89 A.2d 734 (Law. Div. 1952)).
7456 N.J. 326, 266 A.2d 569 (1970). Mrs. Lawlor was injured on September 6, 1974, while
visiting the Park Memorial Cemetery. She filed a complaint against the Cloverleaf defendants on
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whether the amendment of a complaint to include survival and

wrongful death claims against a third-party defendant was timely.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the amendment of the
complaint adding the survival claim related back to the filing of the
third-party complaint and was therefore timely.75 The issue of the
timeliness of the wrongful death claim was never reached. The court
reasoned that if the survival claim was timely, the wrongful death

claim was a fortiori timely. 76 Nevertheless, Justice Jacobs, writing for

the majority, questioned whether the issue, if reached, would be

decided in line with previous New Jersey cases. In dictum, he referred
to the "persuasive position" of out-of-state cases which held that the
.'statutory terminology 'relates to the character of the injury, without
regard to the question of time of suit or death.' -77
The questions raised in Lawlor 78 inspired the supreme court to
reappraise the previous construction given to the Wrongful Death Act
when the issue was raised in Alfone. 79 In evaluating the essential

elements of the wrongful death claim 8° and the underlying interests
addressed by the Act, 8 ' the Alfone court took the independent viewpoint, specifying that recovery in a subsequent wrongful death action
must be tailored to avoid duplication of damages between the personal injury action and the wrongful death action.8 2

February 16, 1965. The Cloverleaf defendants raised a defense of charitable immunity and
additionally filed a third-party complaint against the hospital and doctor responsible for Mrs.
Lawlor's medical care. Mrs. Lawlor died on December 23, 1966, and one month later, the trial
court allowed substitution of her executor as plaintiff and amendment of the claim to include a
direct claim, both survival and wrongful death, against the doctor and hospital. Id. at 329, 266
A.2d at 570.
7 Id. at 343, 266 A.2d at 578. The Lawlor court ruled that: "there is no dispute that where,
as here, the survival action was not barred by limitation, the later death action, instituted well
within two years after the death . . . was not also barred." Id. at 345, 266 A.2d at 579.
76 Id. at 345, 266 A.2d at 579.
7 Id., 266 A.2d at 579 (quoting Hoover's Adm'rx v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 46 W. Va.
268, 33 S.E. 224 (1899)). The court stated in Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 305-06, 204 A.2d 140,
142 (1964), "that the italicized language in [the Wrongful Death Act] was intended to preclude
recovery where the injured person could not have recovered because the defendant did not
commit a wrongful act or the deceased's own conduct would have barred his right to recover."
71 See note 75 .sepraand accompanying text.
11 87 N.J. at 108-07, 432 A.2d at 861.
60 Id. at 108, 432 A.2d at 862. The wrongful death action contains two important elements
not present in any suit brought by the decedent for his personal injuries: death caused by the
defendant's tortious act and the resulting damages flowing to the next of kin.
b' Id. at 107, 432 A.2d at 862. "By requiring 'a fair and equitable apportionment' of damages
in accord with financial need, see N.J.S.A. 2A:31-4, the wrongful death statute addresses
specific interests of dependents that receive only incidental protection in any surviving personal
injury suit. See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3." Id.
L4 Id. at 102, 432 A.2d at 859.
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To construe the Wrongful Death Act as granting independent
rights to the beneficiaries, a showing of legislative intent was required. 8 3 Seeking to extrapolate this intent, the court turned to an
analysis of three principles of statutory construction.8 4 While the
defense strenuously argued that there was evidence of legislative "acquiescence [to] a long-standing judicial interpretation [which was]
indicative of legislative intent," 8 5 this contention was given little
weight since the court found that neither unequivocal judicial interpretation nor legislative acquiescence were "present with clarity."188
Two other guiding principles analyzed by the court were in direct
conflict. On one hand, the statute was in derogation of the common
law and as such should have been strictly construed.8 7 In contrast,
the statute was remedial in nature and was entitled to liberal interpretation to effectuate its purpose.8 8 The court resolved this conflict in
accordance with its earlier decision in Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers,89
which stated that the primary aim of the Wrongful Death Act was
found in its remedial purpose. Further support for the court's adoption of the independent interpretation was the existence of a separate
statute of limitations for each action. This was interpreted as legislative recognition "of the differing personal interests underlying the
action," 90 and proof that the rights of the wrongful death plaintiff are
independent of those of the decedent. 9'
Although the court held that prior adjudication of the personal
injury claim did not bar a claim for wrongful death, the court did not
go so far as to say that a wrongful death action was "independent for
all purposes." 9 2 The inherent limitation in the wrongful death action

81Id. at 108, 432 A.2d at 862.

8, Id. at 109-10, 432 A.2d at 863. See generally 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsT ucTION
§ 49.10 (4th ed. 1973).
85 See Brief Amicus Curiae on behalf of Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange at 1, Alfone v.
Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981).
88 87 N.J. at 109, 432 A.2d at 862. See Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 301, 196 A.2d 523, 526
(1963); Egan v. Erie R.R. Co., 29 N.J. 243, 250, 148 A.2d 830, 834 (1950).
87 87 N.J. at 109, 432 A.2d at 863. See Dacunzo v. Edgye, 19 N.J. 443, 451, 117 A.2d 508,
513 (1955); Carlo v. Okonite Callender Cable Co., 3 N.J. 253, 265, 69 A.2d 734, 741 (1949). See
generally 3 A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 84, § 60.01-6.
88 87 N.J. at 109, 432 A.2d at 863. See Turon v. J&L Construction Co., 8 N.J. 543, 558, 86
A.2d 192, 199 (1952); Soden v. Trenton & Mercer County Traction Corp., 101 N.J.L. 393,
396-97, 127 A. 558, 560 (1925). See generally 3 A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 84.
89 67 N.J. 466, 473, 341 A.2d 613, 617 (1975).
00 87 N.J. at 108, 432 A.2d at 862.
91 Id.

2 Id. at 110, 432 A.2d at 863.
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was that although it redresses a wrong unique to the beneficiaries, the
93
recovery right nonetheless derives directly from the original tort.
Consequently, the wrongful death action was derivative of the prior
action for purposes of "issue preclusion," in that issues resolved in the
personal injury action were not open to litigation in the wrongful
death action.9 4 The court reasoned that both the principle of res
judicatag5 and the privity doctrine96 required that the defendant liti7
If. the personal
gate only once the substantive issues of liability.
death
wrongful
injury action was fully litigated, the issues in the
99
9
The wrongful
action would be limited to causation " and damages.
death plaintiff could not raise new theories of liability, nor could the

93
04

Id.
Id.

,s Id. at 111, 432 A.2d at 864. BLACx'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1470 (4th ed. 1955) defines res
judicata as a "r]ule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by courts of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of rights of parties and their privies in all later suits on points and
matters determined in former suit." See Note, Developments in the Law of Res Judicata, 65
HARV. L. RF,. 818 (1952). The principle of res judicata is applied in two specific ways in this
case. The first is issue preclusion for substantive liability. "'Once the liability of the defendant has
been determined on the merits in a judicial decision, all interested parties should be able to rely
on that determination in ordering their affairs with respect to the accident causing the original
injury." Id. The issue of substantive liability is precluded from subsequent litigation. Id. See note
96 infra, for a discussion of privity.
11 87 N.J. at 111-12, 432 A.2d at 864. The wrongful death beneficiaries are "in privity" with
decedents or successors in interest to the degree that their interests overlap. This is an adaptation
of the principle of res judicata to nonparties which happens "[o]ccasionally . . .[when] justice
and fair play demand that a nonparty to the first suit be bound by the adjudication on the
claim." Id. (citing Vestal, Claim Preclusion and Parties in Privily: Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet
in Perspective, 60 IowA L. Ra'. 973, 975 (1975)). Vestal uses a two-tiered analysis for a
determination of privity. First,
[t]he court should decide whether the recovery in the first suit makes recovery in the
second unnecessary, unfair and undesirable. In other words, the court should determine whether the parties can be viewed as 'in privity.' Second, the measure of
duplicative interest must be established; the parties may be 'in privity' only as to
certain legal relationships and specific matters.
Vestal, supra, at 986. In the case of the Wrongful death litigant, although not a party to the prior
personal injury suit, his interests, "at least insofar as the defendant's liability is concerned were
represented in that action by the decedent." 87 N.J. at 111, 432 A.2d at 864.
91 87 N.J. at 110-11, 432 A.2d at 863. "[I]ssues determined in the personal injury action may
include negligence or percentages of negligences under our comparative negligence statute,
N.J.S.A. 2A: 15-5.1 to 5.3, proximate causes of the injury, duty of the defendant to the decedent,
immunity of the defendant from suit, and strict or vicarious liability." Id. at 112, 432 A.2d at
864.
91 Id. at 113, 432 A.2d at 865. The causation issue in the wrongful death action must be
distinguished from the proximate cause issue in the personal injury action. In the personal injury
action, the plaintiff seeks to show that the tortious conduct of the defendant was the proximate
cause of his injury. In a subsequent wrongful death action, the causation issue is limited to the
question whether the original injury caused the death of the victim. Id.
" id. at 114, 432 A.2d at 865.
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defendant interpose new defenses.100 The court also held that where
the original victim released or settled his claim, the question whether
the substantive issues of liability should be opened to litigation by the
wrongful death plaintiff depended upon the terms of the settlement or
release. '0 1Generally, release was not accorded a res judicata effect on
02
the liability issues.
Having established these basic rules regarding the liability issues,
the court next considered the issue of damages. 03 Certain elements of
damages were unique to the wrongful death claim, such as funeral
expenses and loss of advice and guidance. 0 4 Other elements of damages, however, presented a very real possibility of duplication, 10 5 a
concern which was often given as the very reason for denying successive actions for personal injury and wrongful death. 06 Foremost
among these fears was the possibility of double recovery of damages
for future lost earnings.10 7 The Alfone court expressed particular
concern for this problem but resolved that it could not be the basis for
denying statutory rights.108
The Alfone court rejected the solutions used by other courts to
circumvent the duplication of damages problem, especially the concept of the tort victim as a trustee for his next of kin formulated in
Gaudet.10 9 Instead, the court ordered that the damage award in the
100 Id.
101 Id.
102

Id.

103 Id.
104

See N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:31-5 (West 1952). See. e.g., Frasier v. Public Servs. Int'l.

Transp. Co., 244 F.2d 668, 670 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying New Jersey law); Green v. Bittner, 85
N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980) (advice and guidance of child to parent recoverable in wrongful

death action); Clark v. Prime, 18 N.J. Misc. 226, 12 A.2d 635 (Cir. Ct. 1940) (loss of maternal
advice to child is recoverable in wrongful death action).
os 87 N.J. at 114, 432 A.2d at 865. The court did not decide which elements did not present a
danger of double liability. Id. at 118, 432 A.2d at 867. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF Towrs § 24.6, at 1293 (1956); see also Roberts v. Union Carbide, 415 F.2d 474 (3d
Cir. 1969); W. PeossER, supra note 50, § 717 (2d ed. 1955).
10687 N.J. at 115, 432 A.2d at 866.
107 Id. at 114, 432 A.2d at 865.
If . . . [the] deceased recovers before his death, his recovery for permanent
injuries will be based, under the prevailing American rule, on his prospective
earnings for the balance of his life expectancy at the time of his injury undiminished
by any shortening oJ that expectancy as a result oJ the injury. The danger of double
recovery becomes clear when it is recalled that any benefits of which the survivors
were deprived, by the death, would have come out of these very prospective earnings if deceased had lived.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
los 87 N.J. at 117, 432 A.2d at 867.
109Id. at 116, 432 A.2d at 867. As Justice Powell pointed out in dissent, the theory of fiduciary
responsibility creates more problems than it solves. It does not define the boundaries of the class
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wrongful death action should be tailored to remove the possibility of
duplication of damages.1 0 The directive given was that "no elements

of damages may be sought or recovered that were or could have been
claimed in the earlier personal injury action.""' The trial judge will
determine "the lowest amount that the proofs in the earlier action"
had shown that the "decedent would have earned between the date of
his actual death and the end of his life expectancy."" 2 "That
amount," the court continued, "is subtracted by the personal injury
jury in arriving at its damages award.""13 If the original tort victim
lost
has recovered or could have recovered all of his potential future
4

earnings, the wrongful death plaintiff could not seek them."

To relieve the harshness of this rule as applied to damages that5
were in fact not recovered, the court created an equitable exception "
analogous to the discovery rule articulated in Lopez v. Swyer. 1 6 The
exception was structured for application "[w]here the extent of inju-

ries causing death was not reasonably discoverable at the time of the
decedent's suit," 7 [allowing] the wrongful death plaintiff [to] pursue
elements of damages that technically could have been, but in fact

were not, recovered in the earlier action."" 8 To recover these damages, the burden of proof was placed on the wrongful death plaintiff
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the true extent of the
injuries was not reasonably discoverable at the time of the earlier
action. 119
of potential beneficiaries who are estopped from relitigating loss of support. It also leaves open
the question whether the original victim can be enjoined from spending or completely disposing
of the original award. 414 U.S. at 608 n.21 (Powell, J.,dissenting). It opens the possibility of
collusive lawsuits whereby the beneficiaries sue to have the estate surcharged for breach of
fiduciary duty. Such suits would be potentially in fraud of creditors.
"' 87 N.J. at 117, 432 A.2d at 867.
112

Id.
Id.

Id. at 120, 432 A.2d at 868.
I'
Id. at 117, 432 A.2d at 867.
,I Id. at 118-19, 432 A.2d at 867-68.
"' 62 N.J. 267, 272, 300 A.2d 563, 565 (1973). The "discovery rule" provides that "a cause of
action will be held not to accrue until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable
diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable
claim." Id. The discovery rule is New Jersey's equitable exception to the statute of limitations in
personal injury actions.
"'7 87 N.J. at 119, 432 A.2d at 868.
"I Id. Procedural guidelines were also set out to govern the application of the rule. A hearing
will be held to determine if the wrongful death plaintiff has sustained the burden necessary to
meet the equitable indulgence of the rule. The judge will then decide precisely what elements of
damage the wrongful death plaintiff may seek. The judge is allowed full discretion as to the
types of proof he will entertain at the hearing, including past transcripts, documents and
testimony of witnesses. Id. at 121-22, 432 A.2d at 869.
I" Id. at 119-20, 432 A.2d at 868.
13
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The record developed by the trial court was insufficient for the
supreme court to apply directly the rules established by the case. 20
Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a determination of
precisely what damages Concetta Alfone did or could have sought and
what damages her beneficiaries could now pursue in the wrongful
death action.12 ' The trial court was specifically directed to make
22
findings regarding the question of future lost earnings.
In his dissent, Justice Clifford argued that a "literal reading of
the statute yield[ed) the built-in prerequisite of [the decedent's ability]
to maintain a suit at the time of death." '3 The majority had concluded through statutory analysis that the Act was beneficiary-centered; however, the dissent used the same means of analysis to conclude that the statute was decedent-centered."' 2 4 While admitting
that the Wrongful Death Act was remedial in nature, Justice Clifford
argued that it must be considered in terms of its relationship to the
common law. 2 5 He contended that the controlling case for the interpretation of the Act was Turon v. J. & L. Construction Co., 2 which
suggested that because the statute is in derogation of the common law,
the class "for whom the remedy [was] provided [may] not be ex27
panded beyond its terms." 1
Justice Clifford also argued that the inferences to be drawn from
the New Jersey courts' past interpretation of the Wrongful Death Act
were unambiguous and clearly in accord with the legislative intent to
bestow derivative rights on the next of kin. 28 Justice Clifford also
pointed out that reliance upon precedent from other jurisdictions was
misplaced due to the literal differences between the statutes.129 Unpersuaded by the legal arguments advanced by the majority, the
120 Id. at 123, 432 A.2d at 870.
121 Id.
122 Id.

12 Id. at 125, 432 A.2d at 871 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
124

Id.

12S Id.

1258 N.J. 543, 86 A.2d 192 (1952).
127 Id. at 558, 86 A.2d at 199.
2 87 N.J. at 129, 432 A.2d at 873 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Contra. id. at 109, 432 A.2d at

863.
129Justice Clifford wrote:

[T]he [court] has created a new, super cause of action-fit] cannot be extinguished by a settlement with the injured party during his lifetime, it cannot be
extinguished by satisfying a judgment awarded to the injured party during his
lifetime; and cannot be defeated by the failure of the injured party to have brought
suit within the statutory period during his lifetime. According to the [court] such a
cause of action is an almost invincible right that springs into existence at that decisive
moment when death comes to an injured party.
Id. at 131, 432 A.2d at 874 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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dissent alone focused upon the resultant problems such as "lack of
repose, double recovery, discouragement of settlement, the interests of
unborn heirs and res judicata."130 According to Justice Clifford, the
practical problems created by the instant decision necessitated legisla3
tive rather than judicial reform.' 1
Although, the Aljone decision represents a major breakthrough
32
in recognizing the independent right of action for wrongful death,
the collateral problems generated by the holding diminishes its positive impact. The possibility exists that this decision may expose defendants and their insurance companies to relitigation of settled
claims. Repetitious litigation undermines res judicata, one of the bedrock principles of the judicial system. 33 Inherent in the Alfone decision was a one-sided enforcement of the principles of repose and res
judicata. 13 4 The defendant was adjudged to owe his victim $100,000
for forty years of future pain and suffering. 35 The victim died before
satisfaction of the judgment, but based upon the principle of repose,
that judgment remained valid. 36 Unfortunately for the defendant,
however, damage issues litigated in the original action did not remain
inviolate and the defendant was exposed to further litigation. The
failure or preclusion of the victim from obtaining certain elements of
damages should not be visited on the defendant. Such a result
weakens res judicata by undermining the principles of mutuality and
37
finality of judgment.1
The Alfone decision also has possible disadvantages for plaintiffs,
as insurance companies will show increased reluctance to settle with a
plaintiff who has a potentially serious injury. 38 The strategy of
refusing settlement will force a plaintiff's claim to remain on the trial
lists as long as possible, in hope that the plaintiff will die and two
11,Id. at

130, 432 A.2d at 873 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
J., dissenting).
Id. at 102, 432 A.2d at 859.
I'"
See note 94 so pra.
"' See note 94 supra.
" 87 N.J. at 102, 432 A.2d at 859.
" Id. at 121. 432 A.2d at 869.
'" These policy considerations were discussed by Duffy:
A judgment may not, in fact, cover all the damages. . . . Such a circumstance is
simply an error of fact occurring in the personal injury action. On principles of
finality of decision, the judgment should be considered conclusive as to all damages
that could or should have been recoverable. A judgment against the injured person
should operate as a bar on principles of mutuality. It should be remembered that
error is no respector of sides and works as much against defendants as against
plaintiffs.
Duffy, supra note 35, at 212 n.39.
"' See Brief Amici Curiaeon behalf of American Insurance Association & Alliance of American Insurers at 4-5, Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981).
Id. at 131, 432 A.2d at 874 (Clifford,
I'
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potential claims will be reduced to one. This situation will cause the
"tortfeasor to live with the mortality table at his side and try to
speculate on the risk of double liability if a settlement is made and
139
then a death occurs."'
Even assuming a sincere desire to dispose of the entire claim by
full compensation, the defendant may be precluded from so doing.
The class of statutory beneficiaries does not close until the victim's
death; 40 therefore, the defendant cannot be sure until that point that
he has obtained all the necessary releases.' 4' The possibility of unborn heirs 42 or a status change such as reaching majority, marriage,
or divorce, can significantly alter the population of a class of beneficiaries, thus destroying the finality of the settlement. 43 Certain procedures can diminish these hazards, but elimination of the problem is
impossible. The most useful device for avoiding the problem of relitigation will be the increased use of structured settlements. In appropriate cases where the injury is permanent and potentially life-threatening, the personal injury settlement can provide for a "period certain"
annuity which would continue to pay designated beneficiaries after
4
the victim died, until the expiration or depletion of the annuity.'
This procedure might insure that the beneficiaries' claims are settled
in the first action.
Obtaining releases or contracts not to sue from the next of kin is
another solution.145 This involves open speculation on the part of the
defendant that his tort will be the cause of the victim's death, and that
he can determine who will belong to the class of beneficiaries that he
must compensate. No solution to the problems caused by the possibility of unborn heirs or subsequent marriage or divorce was proferred in
the Alfone decision. The tortfeasor was consigned to live with those
risks should he try to settle.
Frequently, minors will be among the dependents of a tort victim. Release of the future claims of minor children would probably
require the use of court-regulated "friendly" hearings according to
New Jersey Court Rule 4:44. 146 Past procedures developed to release
us Id. at 4.
110See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-4 (West 1952). A survivor may be considered a dependent if
the decedent's contributions aided the survivor in a significant way. Carianni v. Schwerker. 38
N.J. Super. 350, 118 A.2d 847 (App. Div. 1955).
"I1 See note 124 supra.
142Id.

143 Id.; see 87 N.J. at 130, 432 A.2d at 873 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
144 See generally J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 81-82 (2d ed. 1965).
Is 168 N.J. Super. at 332, 403 A.2d at 18.
118N.J. CT. R. 4:44 states:
Actions brought in the Superior Court on behalf of an infant or incompetent.
instituted without process, for the purpose of obtaining the court's approval of a
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present claims of minors should be expanded to encompass the resolution of potential claims of minors so that the number of claims subject

to relitigation is reduced.
A major shortcoming of the Alfone decision is its ambiguous
discussion of the damage issue. The danger of duplication of damages
is a direct consequence of the holding that a wrongful death claim is
not extinguished by the decedent's prior personal injury action arising
out of the same tortious conduct. 47 Prospective earnings is the item
of damages that poses the most conspicuous or persistent instance of
duplication. 148 Not only are prospective earnings a major portion of
the damages recoverable by the personal injury plaintiff, they are an

inevitable element of the classic wrongful death claim, which is statutorily confined to pecuniary losses.' 49 As a result of Alfone, there is a
definable period for which the two plaintiffs' rights to prospective
earnings are coextensive, thus creating the potential for duplication
between the actions. 50 It is the formula for limiting duplication of
damages for prospective earnings that is the proving ground for the
viability of the court's holding.

Double recovery between successive tort actions is a very real
problem as the usual form of the personal injury award is the general
verdict or lump sum award. It is impossible to discern what portion of
the personal injury award was given to compensate for loss of prospective earnings. The court ordered, therefore, that the trial judge who
hears the wrongful death action examine the proofs from the personal
injury action to determine "the lowest amount that the proofs in the

earlier action show decedent would have earned between the date of
his actual death and the end of his life expectancy." 5 1 That "lowest

Id.

settlement shall be brought in any county in which the venue might be laid under R.
4:3-2, and in such actions in the Superior or a county court the papers shall unless
the court otherwise orders, be filed with the clerk of the court before the hearing on
the application for approval.

I'47
Prior to the holding in Alfone the problem of duplication of damages between successive
actions for personal injury and wrongful death did not exist. The personal judgment was thought
to extinguish the wrongful death claim. Roberts v. Union Carbide Corp., 415 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.
1969).
'" 87 N.J. at 114, 432 A.2d at 866.
149

Id.

150A tort victim may recover for future lost earnings for the period between the injury and the
end of his life expectancy. The wrongful death plaintiff may lay claim to those earnings that
would have existed in the period between the decedent's death and the end of his projected life
expectancy. Thus, the wrongful death claim has two definite termini varying only in the point of
commencement from the personal injury claim.
"1 87 N.J. at 120, 432 A.2d at 868. One logical but weak argument is that the wrongful death
plaintiff may recover that entire "lowest" amount. That construction would undoubtedly cause
duplication between the original award and the wrongful death award if the original plaintiff
had contended any degree of permanent disability.
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amount" must be determinative of the maximum amount recoverable
in the wrongful death action for prospective lost earnings. Although
the determination made through examination of proofs offered in the
earlier action may be imprecise or erroneous, it is nonetheless required
under the principle of collateral estoppel. Furthermore, it is the only
viable source by which the component parts of a lump sum verdict
may be distinguished.
Once the "lowest amount admitted into proof' is ascertained,
"[t]hat amount is subtracted by the personal injury jury in arriving at
its damages award."'' 52 Clearly, that step in the formulation is subject to several interpretations. It may mean that the wrongful death
jury is first instructed as to the maximum amount awardable for
prospective earnings, then, based upon evidence presented in the
wrongful death case, the jury reduces the recovery for the wrongful
death plaintiff to the extent that the original plaintiff claimed perma5
nent disability.'

3

An alternative construction of the formulation is that the recovery for prospective earnings is based upon the diminished capacity of
the initial plaintiff. If the original plaintiff claimed that his injury
reduced his earning capacity, the wrongful death plaintiff is entitled
to an award based upon the diminished prospective earnings.'5 4 Support for that conclusion can be based upon the premise that such
tailoring of the award reduces it to an amount clearly not awarded
since it was not initially claimed.
Future application of the damage formula by trial courts will
require creativity to effectively tailor the recovery as the formulation
contained in Alfone is neither truly concrete nor complete. The general directive is that no element of damages may be recovered in both
actions.1 5. 5 The ambiguity of the opinion, however, necessitates that

152

Id.

1-3 A hypothetical example can best illustrate the theory underlying this construction. The
trial judge determines that the lowest amount of prospective earnings for the victim is $10.000.
Since the initial plaintiff claimed a disability of 20%, then 80% of the $10,000 would be
available to the wrongful death plaintiff.
'54 To illustrate this formulation, consider the hypothetical plaintiff who contends that he is
disabled but still capable of earning $10,000 per year. The wrongful death plaintiffs recovery
would be based upon the $10,000 figure, not the full extent of the victim's earning capacity. The
subtraction process involves a calculation by the personal injury jury in the first action that the

victim will not recover for what he can still earn. It is a hypothetical "subtraction." Actually, the
jury simply excludes the victim's continued earning capacity from their consideration of recoverable damages. Thus, the wrongful death plaintiffs recovery is based upon the $10,000 figure.
This formulation is possible, but it runs contrary to established damage principles. Seemingly.
this formulation would give the tortfeasor the benefit of injuring the tort victim.
155 87 N.J. at 117, 432 A.2d at 867.
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the trial courts be left to their own ad hoe devices in" molding the
directive into a concrete formula. 5 6 Complete elucidation of the

formula requires presentation of that issue in a future case.
Speculation in the area of damages recoverable in an action

involving injury to a human being is inevitably compounded by successive actions. t5 7 Many of the damages recoverable, such as pain
and suffering or loss of services, are calculated through visceral reactions rather than concrete facts. 158 The strictures laid down in Alfone
may help to restrain duplication of damages based upon jury specula-

tion, but as Justice Powell pointed out in his dissent in Gaudet,t59 such
rules "will in no way guarantee that the second trier of fact will

succeed in compartmentalizing the allowable from the unallowable
elements of damages in the second trial."' 60
In future actions, therefore, to avoid speculation on the part of
the trial judge and jury in the wrongful death action, a party may
request a special verdict in the original action. As the supreme court
ruled in Nylander v. Rogers,'" "when it is shown that future collateral questions may be affected, the grant [of a special verdict] should

be well nigh automatic."

62

Justice Hall pointed out that "there can

be no doubt of the power of a trial judge on his own motion or the
request of a party to direct a jury to assess and report damages

separately on a plaintiff's separate claims or even in special situations
on items of a single claim." 6 3 Precision in the determination of the

I" Conceivably, cases will arise wherein any possible formulation of the Aijone rules will be
palpably unfair. Hypothetically, a case could arise wherein the plaintiff proved $50,000 in
special damages (medical expenses, etc.). The jury may have returned a verdict of $20,000, that
is, a figure below the claimed special damages. Assume further that the plaintiff did not appeal
and subsequently died. Both plaintiff and defendant in the subsequent wrongful death action
can argue that application of AiJone rules would be unfair. The plaintiff, for example, may
argue that any reduction in the prospective earnings recovery is unjust as the initial plaintiff
never recovered any prospective earnings. The defendant may argue that the initial jury award
is indicative of the victim's failure to adequately prove his case and that jury sympathy carried
the day. Therefore, allowing the wrongful death plaintiff to relitigate this issue is manifestly
unfair.
"s7Fleming, supra note 51, at 602, explains that: "all awards for loss of earnings are necessarily based on speculation of imaginary earnings in the sense that, ex hypothese, the accident has
prevented the plaintiff from actually earning them." Id.
" The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that some of the damages recoverable for
wrongful death are "conjectural" and "based upon uncertainties." See Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J.
1, 15, 424 A.2.d 210, 217 (1980).
"'
414 U.S. 573, 609-10 (1974); see note 170 infra.
414 U.S. at 609.
41 N.J. 236, 196 A.2d 1 (1940).
112Id. at 240, 196 A.2d at 3.
Id. at 239, 196 A.2d at 3.
I61
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damages released in the original action will necessarily reduce speculation in a subsequent wrongful death action.
Justice Clifford pointed out two additional damage questions
unanswered by the majority. The court left open the problem of
duplication of damages in the situation where a spouse had joined as a

party to the personal injury action and recovered for per quod damages, 16 4 and subsequently brings a wrongful death action.1 6 5 The

extent to which the judgment in the personal injury action restrains
the spouse's second action is unclear." 8

Certainly a per quod recov-

ery under the personal injury claim is, in many respects, functionally
equivalent to loss of services. The question whether a per quod recovery will bar a wrongful death action is unanswered.
Another unanswered question was whether the restriction
against recovery for those damages obtained in the personal injury
actions implied a right to enjoin the original victim from wasting the
damages award.167 Since the Alfone court rejected the fiduciary duty
concept articulated in Gaudet, it is doubtful that the original victim
could be restrained from disposing of his entire award should he so
desire. That recovery could include all of his future lost earnings if the
initial jury found that the victim would never work again. The
wrongful death plaintiff has an expectant interest in that recovery
since his recovery may not duplicate the original recovery. 16 8 The
'1 For a complete discussion of per quod damages, see Patrusco v. Prince Macaroni. 50 N.J.
365, 235 A.2d 465 (1967), Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.'2d I
(1965); Zalewski v. Gallagher, 150 N.J. Super. 360, 375 A.2d 1195 (App. Div. 1977). In
Zalewski, the appellate division described per quod damages as the value of a spouse's attention
to "household duties, companionship, comfort and consortium." Id. at 372, 375 A.2d at 1201.
These elements almost duplicate the elements of damages which comprise the pecuniary damage
award for wrongful death, except for consortium. See Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210
(1980). The possibility of per quod recovery highlights a major difference between the actions for
personal injury and wrongful death. If future lost earnings are recovered in the personal injury
action, they belong to the tort victim, not the spouse. The spouse of a deceased tort victim,
however, may claim future lost earnings in a wrongful death action.
I's 87 N.J. at 131, 132 A.2d at 874.
" Id. N.J. CT. R. 4:28-3(b) requires mandatory joinder of all claims by spouses for physical
injury and consortium losses resulting from the negligent conduct of others. Claims that are not
joined shall be deemed waived unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The issue has not
been raised and it is not clear as to whether a spouse could be a party to both the wrongful death
action and the personal injury action. Another question arises as to whether a spouse who fails to
join in the initial personal injury action should be barred from bringing a wrongful death action
by N.J. CT. R. 4:28-3(b). The most important question is the extent to which the per quod
recovery in the personal injury action is res judicata to the wrongful death claim. As the court
pointed out in Zalewski v. Gallagher, 150 N.J. Super. 350, 372, 375 A.2d 1195. 1201 (1977).
"[the spouse's] injury consisted of the loss of her husband's services for one continuing time
period. To allow her to recover twice for this period of time would violate the self-evident
principle that there should be one satisfaction for a wrong when dealing with compensatory
damages." Id.
,'7 See 87 N.J. at 131, 432 A.2d at 874 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
'" See Fleming, supra note 51, at 605.
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extent to which a potential wrongful death plaintiff may protect his
expectant interest is totally unresolved, and the
bench and bar have
69
resolution.
its
to
as
guidelines
no
been given
While in theory the limitations imposed by the Alfone court were
impartial, the speculative nature of the damages and the frequency of
expression of jury sympathy will lead to inequitable results. 70 The
inequities inherent in the Alfone decision reveal an underlying lack of
logical consistency, the application of which will lead to incongruous
results. For example, a wrongful death plaintiff may be foreclosed
from pursuing his claim, regardless of its validity, if the original

victim proceeded to suit on an erroneous theory of liability. This bars
the wrongful death plaintiff from raising a valid theory of liability.' 7 ' In contrast, a valid release executed by the victim, or a decision not to prosecute his claims against the tortfeasor, will not bar the
172

wrongful death claim.
Noticeably absent from the holding in Alfone was any reference
to the cases of Knabe v. Hudson Bus TransportationCo. 7 3 and Coulter v. New Jersey Pulverizing Co. 74 These cases held that if a person
failed to institute a personal injury action within the statute of limitations, the wrongful death action was precluded even though filed
within two years of death. 175 The decision in Alfone raises considerable doubt as to the continued vitality of these holdings. If the court
continues the logic of Alfone,"'0 the resulting law may be truly anoma1" 87 N.J. at 131, 432 A.2d at 874 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
170 Justice Powell, dissenting in Gaudet, stated:

As anyone who has tried jury cases knows, jury sympathy commonly overcomes
a theoretical inability to recover ...
One expression of jury sympathy is commonplace, despite its conflict with the
damages principles that in theory control. But certainly two opportunities for jury
sentiment cross the line between benignity and bonanza and should not be sanctioned.
414 U.S. at 609-10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
17,87 N.J. at 114, 432 A.2d at 865.
112 Id. The wrongful death plaintiff will be constrained by the terms of the release as far as the
elements of damages he may pursue. The issues open to litigation will depend upon the terms of
the settlement or release. Usually, a general release will not have a res judicata effect on the
liability issue. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
173 111 N.J.L. 333, 168 A. 418 (1933).
11 11 N.J. Misc. 5, 163 A. 661 (1932).
"5 See note 58 supra.
176Schumaker, supra note 40, at 124, stated:
If it is to be admitted that there are two causes of action, it would seem absurd
to hold that where the decedent's right is barred by the statute of limitations, the
right of the administrator is also barred because the deceased if alive could not have
an action. The proper holding in such a case would be to look at the death as the
time when the cause of action first accrued in favor of the administrator under Lord
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lous. The possibility exists that if the original victim ignores his claim
he will not jeopardize the rights of his beneficiaries. Proceeding to suit
and not succeeding for such reasons as choosing the wrong theory of
liability, wrong expert or wrong attorney, however, may bar the
wrongful death plaintiff from recovery. Such results are logically
inconsistent.
The decision in Aifone also raises some thorny problems for the
practicing tort litigator. The damages recoverable in the wrongful
death action are limited to those damages that the original plaintiff
sought or could have sought in the original action, subject to the
equitable discovery exception. 77 An issue arises as to whether the
wrongful death plaintiff should be represented by the attorney who
represented the original victim. Once the victim has died, the original
attorney may be the most qualified witness to testify as to what the
victim knew about the state of his claim and how diligently such
knowledge was pursued. An attorney cannot usually act as both counsel and witness, and under circumstances where his testimony may
affect his personal interests he may be absolutely barred from acting
as counsel.'

78

One must also question whether the attorney's file

would be subject to discovery by the defendant. 79 Defense counsel
lack guidance as to what lengths they should pursue these questions.
The Alfone rationale might reasonably be extended to allow a right of
action by the beneficiary against the original attorney for negligent
representation of the original victim, as that negligence may have
foreclosed his own legitimate claim.
In practical application the rules laid down in Alfone may be
costly, cumbersome and, in some cases, nearly impossible to apply.
Limiting the statutory language solely to a question of whether there
Campbell's Act and to allow him to recover whether or not the action of the injured
person is barred. If ...the cause of action under Lord Campbell's Act does not arise
until death, the statute of limitations should not start running until that event.
Id. See also Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 543 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1038 (1977). Judge Gibbons implied in Goodman that the links between the two statutes of
limitation is a "gloss" not legislatively intended.
171 87 N.J. at 118-19, 432 A.2d at 867-68.
'7 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DRS-101 to 102 (1979).
"
In theory, the file of the plaintiff's attorney might be discoverable under rule 26(b)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision
(b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking the discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means.
FE. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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was original tortious conduct is an artificial constraint which very few
courts have accepted. 80 As Justice Clifford aptly pointed out, neither

New Jersey precedent' 8" nor legislative action supports such a con82
struction.
The construction given the Wrongful Death Act for the past
eighty years granted a claim to the wrongful death plaintiff only if the
decedent had possessed a viable claim. The logical consistency of that
position and the enormity of the practical problems 8 3 caused by
Alfone make a persuasive argument for legislative action. It is time for

the legislature to rectify the situation by amending the Act to meet
84
present day realities.
Maureen Chesson

Annot., 39 A.L.R. 2d 579 (1925). See note 50 supra.
87 N.J. at 128, 432 A.2d at 873. See generally Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 3.35
(1974); Craf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Turon v. J. & L. Construction Co., 8
N.J. 543, 86 A.2d 192 (1952); Knabe v. Hudson Bus Transp. Co., 111 N.J.L. 333, 168 A. 418
(1933); McKeering v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 65 N.J.L. 57, 46 A. 715 (1900); Cooper v. Shore
Elec. Co., 63 N.J.L. 558, 44 A. 633 (1899); Tharp v. Shannon, 95 N.J. Super. 298, 230 A.2d 902
(Law Div. 1967); Brignoli v. Durotest Corp., 44 N.J. Super. 95, 129 A.2d 727 (App. Div. 1957),
afj'd on other grounds, 26 N.J. 33, 138 A.2d 408 (1958); Liberia v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels,
Inc., 20 N.J. Super. 292, 89 A.2d 734 (Law Div. 1952); see notes 75-76 infra.
'2
87 N.J. at 126 n.1, 432 A.2d at 87 n.l. The bill presently pending in the New Jersey
Senate, No. 1043, does not contemplate such a change.
'"' The practical consideratons for attorneys and insurance companies caused by the instant
case are enormous. The cost of successive litigation will have an effect upon the cost and
availability of insurance. A more mundane problem involves the closing and disposal of files. No
attorney or insurance company can dispose of any file relating to a personal injury action until
two years after the death of the original victim, without fearing that valuable evidence may have
been destroyed. Courts will be faced with the requirement of keeping transcripts of trials long
past their usual life span since these transcripts will be required should there be an A1jone
hearing. The utility of these transcripts in older cases is doubtful, since the idiosyncrasies of one
reporter are not always decipherable by a subsequent transcriber.
'"1 87 N.J. at 131, 432 A.2d at 871 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
'6

','

